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This paper focuses on measuring the extent to which publicly subsidized transfers in Latin America 
and the Caribbean redistribute income. The redistributive power of 56 transfers in eight countries is 
measured by their simulated impacts on poverty and inequality, and by their distributional 
characteristic. Our findings suggest that public transfers can be effective instruments to redistribute 
income to the poor. Yet frequently they have not managed to do so. The redistributive impacts from 
social insurance are limited—and even regressive in some countries. This is due to two design factors: 
a ‘truncation’ in coverage due to requirements of membership in formal labour markets which exclude 
the majority of the poor, and highly generous unit benefits for those in the upper quintiles. The more 
recent emergence of social assistance only partially offsets this historical truncation of public transfers 
in the region. Despite coverage and distributional patterns that favour the poor, small unit subsidies 
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food based programmes and scholarships being regressive.  
Keywords: social protection, insurance, redistribution, targeting, poverty, inequality, welfare 
JEL classification: D31, H55, I31, I38   
The World Institute for Development Economics Research (WIDER) was 
established by the United Nations University (UNU) as its first research and 
training centre and started work in Helsinki, Finland in 1985. The Institute 
undertakes applied research and policy analysis on structural changes 
affecting the developing and transitional economies, provides a forum for the 
advocacy of policies leading to robust, equitable and environmentally 
sustainable growth, and promotes capacity strengthening and training in the 
field of economic and social policy making. Work is carried out by staff 
researchers and visiting scholars in Helsinki and through networks of 
collaborating scholars and institutions around the world. 
www.wider.unu.edu publications@wider.unu.edu 
 
UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research (UNU-WIDER) 
Katajanokanlaituri 6 B, 00160 Helsinki, Finland 
 
Typescript prepared by Lisa Winkler at UNU-WIDER 
 
The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s). Publication does not imply 
endorsement by the Institute or the United Nations University, nor by the programme/project sponsors, of 
any of the views expressed. 





   1
1 Introduction 
The recovery of economic growth in most countries of Latin America and the Caribbean 
(LAC) by the 1990s has been accompanied by the world wide trend towards 
globalization and increased pressure to be competitive. These developments have led to 
increased concerns not only about the drivers of international competiveness, but also 
about the ability of LAC countries to protect the poorer segment of their population 
from economic shocks that are easily propagated in an increasingly interdependent 
economic environment. For example, the increased pressure to be internationally 
competitive has led to the recognition that investments in education and skills of labour 
can be a means of not only alleviating poverty, but also of increasing competitiveness in 
the international sphere. At the same time, the recent increasing trend in food prices and 
the current financial crisis originating in the US mortgage market, have increased 
concerns about the poverty, inequality, and redistributional impacts of economic shocks 
associated with globalization (World Bank 2008).  
The social policies in LAC countries that have evolved in over the last decade can be 
characterized by two key features: stronger social safety nets that target resources to the 
poor and vulnerable, and transfer programmes conditioned on investments in human 
capital. The experience gained during the earlier years of import substitution policies 
suggested that a targeted approach to safety nets may be more sustainable, at least 
fiscally, than widespread subsidies to goods and services as an instrument of social 
policy towards protection from poverty. Additional key instruments of social policy 
towards poverty alleviation and redistribution include the conditional cash transfer 
(CCT) programmes, such as Oportunidades in Mexico, Familias en Accion in 
Colombia,  Bolsa Familia in Brazil, and other related programmes in Ecuador, 
Nicaragua, Honduras, Peru, and Chile, that combine redistribution of income with 
incentives towards household investment in education, health, and nutrition.  
This paper, extracted from a larger regional study by Lindert et al. (2006), provides one 
of the first investigations of the redistributive outcomes of 56 public transfer 
programmes adopted in eight countries in LAC: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, the 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru.1 Cross-country evidence on the 
extent to which some types of transfer programmes are better instruments of social 
protection and redistribution of income than others, allows for a more informed 
assessment of the role and nature of social policy in an economic environment of 
increasing competition for public resources.  
Social assistance and social insurance 
The literature on social protection generally distinguishes between two categories of 
public transfers: social insurance and social assistance. This distinction often builds on 
the social risk management concept in which social insurance helps people mitigate the 
impact of risks, while social assistance helps households cope with risks. In addition to 
risk coping, many social assistance programmes focus largely on helping raise the 
                                                 
1  The full regional study can be accessed at the link: 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/LACEXT/0,,contentMDK:20871694
~pagePK:146736~piPK:146830~theSitePK:258554,00.html    2
consumption levels of the chronic poor. Another common distinction involves sources 
of funding, with social insurance largely drawing on contributions and social assistance 
being non-contributory.  
In general the classification of public transfers into social insurance and social 
assistance using a single classification is bound to raise some criticisms. To minimize 
such problems we distinguish between social assistance and social insurance transfers: 
objectives, eligibility requirements, and financing.2  
Social assistance transfers commonly have the explicit objectives of reducing poverty 
and inequality. In contrast, the core objectives of social security and other social 
insurance systems are to prevent poverty among the elderly and smooth consumption 
profiles over a person’s lifetime (combining elements of inter-temporal individual 
savings and risk pooling).3 Nonetheless, many recognize that social security systems 
also play an important role in society’s income redistribution policies (equity aspects), 
particularly with pay-as-you-go or multi-pillar systems. As such, we consider social 
assistance and (net) social insurance programmes side-by-side as explicit redistributive 
tools. 
A defining characteristic of social insurance programmes in LAC is that they typically 
tie eligibility to membership in the formal labour market. Since much of the labour 
force, and particularly the poor, do not work in the formal sector, they are largely 
missed by these transfer schemes. In contrast, social assistance transfers rarely base 
eligibility on formal employment. Rather, social assistance programmes generally use 
the individual or household (not the formal worker) as the assistance unit, provided that 
they fit certain income or poverty targeting criteria. 
The third distinguishing feature is that social insurance programmes usually involve 
transfers for which beneficiaries make at least partial contributions that involve risk 
pooling. Put another way, beneficiaries of social insurance transfers know they will 
receive some benefit back from their contributions into the pooled fund, but the benefit 
is not necessarily directly proportional to their contributions (and in fact, many public 
insurance schemes run considerable deficits, as discussed below). Social assistance 
programmes generally do not require any direct ‘risk-pooling’ contributions from their 
beneficiaries. Some assistance programmes can involve contributions (for example, a 
partial payment for a subsidized food), but these contributions involve no pooling of 
risk (and tend to be minimal). 
Given that social insurance is financed by contributions, it is quite reasonable to 
question the treatment of social insurance payments as ‘transfers’. The basic premise for 
classifying these benefits as public transfers is that many social security systems in LAC 
are unfunded, public defined benefit schemes that incur significant tax financed deficits. 
Despite formal membership contributions, most public social security regimes in LAC 
run significant deficits due to higher benefits pay-out than collection of contributions. 
Like social assistance programmes, these pension deficits are financed by general tax 
revenues and thus constitute ‘public transfers’ or subsidies from the government 
                                                 
2  See Annex 2 in Lindert et al. (2006) for details on classification for specific case-study countries 
analysed in this paper. 
3  Rofman (2005).    3
(taxpayers) to the beneficiary households.4 As such, they clearly have important 
redistributive impacts that merit investigation.  
Indeed, pension deficits in LAC are significant. In Brazil, for example, pension deficits 
represented 3.7 per cent of GDP in 2003 for the two main pension schemes at the 
federal level alone—or 40 per cent of total benefits paid out. Add in pension deficit 
from schemes operated by sub-national governments, and the total pensions deficit 
climbs to 5.6 per cent of GDP. Similarly, in Argentina pension deficits averaged 3.6 per 
cent of GDP, or 56 per cent of total benefits paid out, from 1999–2004.5 (for more 
details on pension deficits for all eight countries included in this analysis see Annex 3 of 
Lindert et al. 2006).  
Clearly, there are many other aspects of the design and performance of pensions 
systems—such as their affect on national savings, the accumulation of capital, the 
labour market or the fiscal situation—that can have an indirect impact on equity 
outcomes. In this paper we assess social insurance transfers in terms of their incidence 
on poverty and their current redistributive impact—and do not address longer term 
macroeconomic issues (solvency) nor their indirect impact on equity.  
This paper analyses ‘net transfers’ from pensions, defined as the benefits received 
minus total contributions (i.e., the portion of benefits that is financed by general tax 
revenues due to deficits in the pension system), rather than gross benefits (defined as 
full benefits received, as reported in the household survey).6 Again, the basic premise 
for this is that ‘net pension subsidies’ (net of contributions) compete for tax financed 
resources with social assistance and other forms of spending, with very different 
redistributive patterns.  
Ideally, the ‘net pension subsidy’ for each individual should be based on the net present 
value of the pension income received by a pensioner over his whole life, minus the 
value of his/her contributions to the pension plan over his/her working life.7 The main 
shortcoming of this approach is the absence of data on an individual’s (historical) 
pension contributions. In the absence of such data, we adopt an alternative, albeit 
imperfect, approach.  
                                                 
4  A related argument objects specifically to the classification of civil servant pensions as public 
transfers. The argument usually runs along the lines of ‘the general tax revenues used to pay civil 
servant pensions are the employer contributions, and in this case, the employer is the government’. 
This argument has a point, but the question is an issue of magnitude—civil servant pensions tend to be 
very large—and also the fact that even with mandated contributions, these schemes run significant 
deficits. Brazil’s federal civil servant pension scheme, for example, ran a deficit of about 1.7 per cent 
of GDP—almost the same deficit as the publicly-managed pension scheme for a much larger number 
of private sector workers. Moreover, civil servants tend to be at the higher end of the income 
spectrum, so these large tax-financed deficits are going largely to the rich, as our paper demonstrates 
below.  
5  Source: Dirección de Análisis de Gasto Publico y Programmeas Sociales. 
6  It is important to note that we have also carried out the same analysis using gross rather than ‘net’ 
pension transfers without any notable change in the findings reported for the net pension transfers.  
7  Afonso and Fernandes (2006) estimate expected contributions and benefit flows for a representative 
group of households over the period from 1976 to 1999 for Brazil, using data from the national 
household survey (PNAD).    4
For all countries, we use public accounts data (see Annexes 2 and 3 in Lindert et al. 
2006) and estimate the ‘average net subsidy coefficient’ which equals: (total benefits 
paid out minus total contributions received) / (total benefits paid out). The pension 
received by an individual (as reported in the household survey) is then multiplied by this 
average net subsidy coefficient. While this approach attempts to allow for the fact that 
pensions are partially contributory, it involves a number of implicit assumptions. For 
example, the calculation of the average net transfer coefficient assumes implicitly that 
the current contributions to the pension system represent the history of contributions of 
the current beneficiaries. This assumption ignores the substantial heterogeneity that may 
exist among the earlier contributions of the current participants in the pension system. 
Some of the current participants, for example, may have contributed nothing while 
others may have contributed more than they receive (in net present value terms). 
Moreover, this heterogeneity may not be neutral across the income distribution. 
With these considerations in mind, the rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2, presents the measures of redistribution used to evaluate the extent to which 
public transfers redistribute income and impact on social welfare. Section 3 discusses 
the data sources and the measures of welfare employed, while Section 4 present the 
main results. Section 5 presents some conclusions and policy implications. 
2 Measuring  redistribution 
To measure the impact of transfers on poverty and inequality, we present poverty and 
inequality indices before and after the transfer. We use the Foster–Greer–Thorbecke 
(FGT: 1984) family of the poverty headcount (α =0), poverty gap (α =1), and poverty 
severity (α =2) with all transfers: 
∑
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where  Λ(.) as an indicator function that takes the value 1 if its argument is true and 0 
otherwise.  w
h
  represents the number of persons in the household multiplied by the 
household weight in the survey, and y
h represents the reported income or consumption 
of a household, and z equals a poverty line, which we set equal to the greatest income in 
the bottom quintile of the country’s income distribution. Since we use probabilistic 
household surveys for estimation and desire information that represents the country 
rather than the sample, we use a database of households but weights equal to w
h for all 
indices. 
For each transfer, we present the same FGT index without the per capita value of the 
transfer dm
h to household h, i.e.: 
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The inequality statistics with and without transfers are constructed along similar lines. 
The social welfare impact of transfers is measured using a measure known as the   5
distributional characteristic index (DCI).8 This measure has the advantages of allowing 
for an analysis of the redistributive impact of transfers that (a) takes into account the full 
spectrum of households (not just certain quintiles); (b) allows one to asses how much 
better or worse one transfer programme is compared to another; and (c) is independent 
of the different sizes of their budgets. The distributional characteristic offers several 
advantages over other statistics of redistribution such as coverage, absolute and relative 
incidence, and related measures, such as the Coady et al. (2004) CGH measure.  
First, the distributional characteristic makes value judgments—in particular, concern for 
the poor relative to concern for the rich—transparent and flexible. Second, the 
distributional characteristic allows for a broader class of social welfare functions than 
other measures permit. Third, the distributional characteristic avoids the controversy 
and difficulty of specifying a poverty line. Kanbur and Squire (2001) note one drawback 
of measures that assign zero welfare to marginal income of households above a poverty 
line: the well-being of someone just above a poverty line is similar to the well-being of 
someone just below a poverty line. Pritchett (2004) similarly argues that in describing 
well-being, a social welfare function should be ‘non-paternalistic’. The use of low 
poverty lines has difficulty passing this test. Fourth, the DCI is useful for analysing 
redistributive effectiveness because it allows for the quantitative comparison of how 
much better or worse programmes are relative to each other independently of the 
(different) sizes of their budgets. In other words, for programmes with the same budget, 
a programme with a larger distributional characteristic is a programme that has a greater 
effect on social welfare. Fifth, the distributional characteristic can be decomposed into 
the welfare effect achieved through the selection of beneficiary households (targeting) 
and through varying the size of transfers across beneficiary households (redistribution). 
Like other indices, the distributional characteristic allows for analysis of the impact of 
programme reforms from an initial, imperfect situation, and it allows quantitative 
comparison across programmes of how much better one programme is than another. 
Sixth, the distributional characteristic takes into consideration all the households in the 
economy by assigning welfare weights to every household. Moreover, the concern of 
the society towards the poor people may be allowed to vary by changing the value of a 
single parameter. Undercoverage and leakage for example, judge a programme by 
whether a poor or non-poor household or not is covered by the programme, without 
taking into consideration the fact that the ‘rich’ household participating in the 
programme may be actually just above the poverty line and not from the top of the 
income distribution. Similarly the severity of poverty measure P(2) tends to assign 
welfare weights to households below the poverty line while those just above the poverty 
line are given zero welfare weights. 
To derive the distributional characteristic, consider an economy with two groups, 
households and government, and a programme with a fixed transfer budget B.9 Social 
welfare is specified as a standard Bergson–Samuelson function: 
                                                 
8  For related applications of the DCI the reader is referred to Coady and Skoufias (2004) and Skoufias 
and Coady (2007).  
9  To keep things simple, we do not concern ourselves with the source of funds (e.g., taxing the richer 
households) for the budget allocated to poverty alleviation since one can think of this source of funds 
as being the same across competing programmes and thus cancelling out in comparisons.    6
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h ,  is the indirect utility function for household h,  p is the vector of 
commodity prices faced by the household and y is total household income defined 
through the household budget constraint as: 
h h h h px m wl y = + =  
where w is a vector of factor prices, 
h l  is the supply of factors by the household, 
h m  is 
lump sum transfers from the government to the household, and 
h px  is total household 
expenditures on commodities. Household indirect utility is assumed to be decreasing in 
commodity prices, increasing in factor prices and increasing in lump sum transfers. A 
transfer programme can be characterized by a vector 
1,..., ,...,
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where 
h β  (the ‘welfare weight’) is the social value of extra income to household h. 
Multiplying and dividing the right hand side of (4) by the programme budget 
∑ =
h
h dm B gives: 
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where 
h θ is the share of the transfer budget going to each household and  ∑ =
h
h hθ β λ . 
Equation (5) can be used to highlight a number of important points on the welfare effect 
of programmes. The term λ , also called the distributional characteristic (or DCI) of the 
programme, represents the marginal benefit of distributing a unit of income (US$1) 
through a transfer programme relative to the marginal cost (i.e., the budget ). Thus the 
value of λ  does not depend on the size of the programme budget and a comparison of 
the values of λ  across different programmes allows to compare the social value of 
distributing income through different programmes independently of the programmes’ 
budgets. The full welfare effect of a programme is described by the product of λ  with 
the size of the programme budget B. Thus programmes with the same value of λ  but 
higher budgets are likely to have a higher effect of social welfare. Alternatively, 
Equation (5) implies that if the budget B is the same across all alternative programmes 
considered then a comparison of the values of λ  for each programme provides ‘a 
sufficient statistic’ of the welfare effect of programmes.10 
                                                 
10  Also, given any two programmes i and j, with  j i λ λ <  the ratio  j i λ λ  provides an estimate of the 
budget savings that can be realized through allocating resources from programme i to the better   7
As Equation (5) highlights, the distributional characteristic is weighted average of 
welfare weights of the social welfare impact of a transfer instrument multiplied by the 
share of the transfer going to each household. Therefore λ  will differ across transfer 
programmes both because welfare weights differ across households and because the 
structure of transfers (i.e. who receives them and how much) differs across programmes. 
The greater the proportion of the budget ending up in the hands of the poorest 
households, the greater the distributional characteristic. The calculation of λ  thus 
requires specifying welfare weights for each household. A useful and common method 
for specifying these weights derives from Atkinson’s (1970) constant elasticity social 
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where k is a reference household. Often that reference household is on the poverty line 
z, so  z y
k = . In Equation (6), ε captures aversion to inequality, with aversion increasing 
in ε. For example, ε = 0 implies no aversion to inequality—a dollar has a dollar of value 
regardless of who receives it—so all welfare weights take on the value unity. A value  
ε = 1 implies that if household h has twice (half) the income of household k, then the 
welfare weight of household h is 0.5 (2.0) but the welfare weight of household k is 
unity. As ε approaches infinity, the welfare impact of transfers to the poorest household 
dominates the evaluation, consistent with a Rawlsian maxi-min social welfare 
perspective where one cares only about the welfare impact on the poorest household. 
For example, if we divide households into income quintiles and attach to them a welfare 
weight based on quintile mean income, then as ε increases, the ranking of programmes 
will be increasingly influenced by the share of transfers going to the poorest quintile. 
Specifying welfare weights using greater values of ε can incorporate concern for 
poverty without introducing sharp distinctions between poor and non-poor households. 
A particular value of the distributional characteristic can be interpreted as the number of 
units social welfare generated per dollar transferred. For transfers with many 
beneficiaries, a more direct explanation is difficult. But for a transfer with only one 
beneficiary, the distributional characteristic would equal the marginal utility of that 
beneficiary.  
The distributional characteristic can be decomposed into two indices; each index is both 
conceptually and empirically useful. Define dm* as the average transfer to beneficiaries, 
i.e., the total amount of transfers divided by the number of beneficiaries, where 
beneficiaries are those with dm
h > 0. Then add and subtract dm* across all beneficiaries, 
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targeted programme j (i.e., a programme with the highest λ ) under the maintained assumption that 
the two programmes have the same welfare effect ( ) j i dW dW = .   8
where  T λ  is the targeting efficiency and  R λ  is the redistributive ‘sizing’ efficiency of the 
transfer instrument. So  R λ  captures the welfare impact, keeping targeting constant, of 
deviating from uniform transfers. Also,  T λ  captures the welfare impact of a programme 
that divides B into equal amounts and gives them to the same beneficiary households, 
and  R λ  is the adjustment that needs to be made to allow for the differentiation of 
transfer sizing across households in a more progressive ( R λ  > 0) or regressive ( R λ   < 0) 
manner. For programmes that give every beneficiary identical transfers,  R λ  = 0. The 
sense in which  R λ  captures the redistributive efficiency of the policy instrument is made 
clearer by interpreting it as the welfare impact of a self-financing programme that 
transfers 
k dm  to households and finances transfers by a lump sum tax on all beneficiary 
households, i.e., all households with 
k dm > 0.  
3 Data 
Large household surveys offer the most direct way to empirically measure the outcomes 
of transfers. This paper presents redistributive outcomes from household surveys for 56 
public transfer interventions in eight LAC countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru. Several reasons 
motivated the selection of these eight countries. First, each offers a recent and large 
household survey with information on specific public transfers.11 Second, these 
countries represent a range of social protection systems. As discussed above, LAC 
countries can be divided into a stylized typology of three types of countries according to 
their level and mix of spending on social protection transfers. The countries selected for 
case studies in this paper represent a mix of countries from each of these three stylized 
groups.  
The inclusion of questions on specific transfers in household survey questionnaires 
drives the extent to which we can measure the redistributive effectiveness of these 
transfers. Table 1 lists the social assistance and social insurance transfers, as well as 
other ‘non-public’ transfers, that were included in household surveys—and hence in our 
analysis of the redistributive impacts of transfers in our eight case study countries. It 
also indicates what share of total public social assistance and social insurance spending 
were ‘captured’ by the transfers included in the household survey questionnaires (see 
Annex 2 in Lindert et al. 2006 for more details). 
The household surveys capture most (gross) pension spending for the countries in our 
sample. Nonetheless, the share of spending on social assistance captured in household 
surveys varies significantly, ranging from 23 per cent of social assistance spending in 
Brazil to 92 per cent for Guatemala. This raises some important caveats with respect to 
the inclusion of social assistance programmes in our analysis. Notably, due to data 
limitations (and the fact that the analysis is ‘hostage’ to the specific programmes 
                                                 
11  A longer list of countries was initially considered. Some, such as Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Uruguay, 
were excluded (despite significant spending on public transfers and/or existence of programmes of 
interest) because the household surveys available at the time the analysis was conducted did not 
include sufficient detail on receipt of specific programmes. Others, such as El Salvador and Paraguay 
were excluded because of limited existence of public transfer programmes (and low spending), and 
consequently, low coverage of such programmes in household surveys.   9
captured in single year cross-section surveys), some important social assistance 
programmes were inevitably left out. Broadly speaking, several notable workfare 
programmes, such as Argentina’s former Trabajar programme,12 and Colombia’s 
Empleo en Acción, were excluded from the analysis because they were not included in 
the household surveys in question. Some early childhood development or nutrition 
programmes were included in household surveys and hence our analysis (if they 
involved a significant cash or in-kind transfer component), but the social service aspects 
of many ECD and related programmes were underrepresented in the surveys. Social 
funds were also left out since they involve transfers to communities and not households, 
and as such were not captured in the household surveys. In some instances, specific 
notable programmes—such as Brazil’s BPC-LOAS disability and elderly assistance and 
Colombia’s  Familias en Acción were not included in the household survey 
questionnaires.   
Other methodological caveats  
All of our empirical measures of the redistributive power of public transfer programmes 
are based on some implicit assumptions that might have an effect on the conclusions 
that are drawn from these measures. It is thus necessary to state these implicit 
assumptions up front. Our preferred measure of welfare is household consumption per 
capita inclusive of all the public and private received (see Annex 5 in Lindert et al. 
2006, for a more detailed discussion of estimating redistribution in practice).13 In three 
of the countries (Argentina, Chile, and the Dominican Republic) where a consumption 
measure is either not available or problematic, we use household income inclusive of all 
public and private transfers received. The sensitivity tests that we conducted suggest 
that that these assumptions have relatively little influence on the resulting estimates of 
the redistributive impact of transfers. In addition, in the calculations of the impact of the 
public transfers on poverty, inequality, and welfare, it is assumed that the removal (or 
receipt) of the public transfer does not have any significant effects on household labour 
supply behaviour. Although the sensitivity of our findings to this latter assumption was 
not investigated, the limited evidence that is available on this issue suggests that this 
may not be a serious cause of concern.  
The eight household surveys used in this study have similar structures but varied 
methodological details. All but Guatemala’s ENCOVI  survey conducted interviews in 
2002, 2003, or 2004. All the surveys have national coverage except Argentina, which 
surveyed only urban areas. In Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Mexico, and Peru, the four 
surveys for which we use consumption data, we measure welfare by per capita 
consumption. For Argentina, Chile, and the Dominican Republic we measure welfare by 
per capita income. When available, we use the welfare aggregate that the survey’s 
implementing agency constructed. For the Guatemala survey, we use the consumption 
aggregate constructed by the National Institute of Statistics (INE) and used in the 
Guatemala poverty assessment (World Bank 2003b). For the Colombia survey we use 
                                                 
12  In fact, other programme-specific analyses show that Argentina’s former Trabajar public works 
programme was quite progressive (well-targeted), with a Coady-Grosh-Hoddinott Index of 4.00 
(higher than programmes included in our sample). The programme, however, was phased out and 
replaced by the Household Heads programme analysed in this paper.  
13  Note that, unless otherwise specified, all results are on a per capita basis using quintiles ranking 
individuals on post-transfer incomes or consumption.    10
the consumption aggregate that Nuñez and Espinosa (2004) constructed. We use 
IBGE’s consumption aggregate for Brazil and construct the consumption aggregate for 
Mexico following Deaton and Zaidi (2002). All details of consumption and income 
aggregates appear in Table 1. We include the value of transfers in consumption 
aggregates, and we measure per capita consumption as the household’s total 
consumption divided by the number of individuals in the household.  
4 Results 
Household surveys allow us to estimate inequality and poverty indices before and after 
transfers, though these estimates do not take into account possible behavioural 
responses to either scenario (e.g., possible reduced work effort due to the transfers).14 
4.1  Public transfers and inequality 
The impact of public transfers on inequality is examined via simulated impacts on 
inequality (Ginis) with and without the transfers.15 Figure 1 reveals that the impacts of 
existing public transfers on inequality in LAC are fairly muted. Social assistance has a 
stronger impact in reducing inequality than social insurance. Interestingly, social 
assistance does reduce inequality by more than a ‘Gini’ point in several countries, 
despite relatively small unit transfers. The impact is largest for Argentina’s social 
assistance (Jefes programme), due to higher unit subsidies associated with a fairly well 
targeted programme. Inequality impacts of social assistance transfers in Brazil appear to 
be lower, though these impacts could be underestimated due to the fact that the 
household survey (POF 2002–03) missed capturing several large social assistance 
programmes (notably: BPC-LOAS for the poor elderly and disabled, and the integrated 
and expanded Bolsa Família programme). In fact, evidence from a new household 
survey (PNAD 2004) suggests that these very social assistance transfers may have 
played an important role in the notable recent fall in inequality in Brazil.16 
The impacts of social insurance on inequality are fairly small—and in some cases these 
schemes actually increase inequality (Guatemala, Peru). In contrast, social insurance 
schemes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile tend to decrease inequality. In each of these 
countries, although their social insurance schemes are regressive in their own right (i.e., 
have a positive concentration coefficient) they tend to be less unequally distributed than 
income from other sources. Consequently, the Gini for pre-transfer inequality (without 
the social insurance transfers) is higher (more unequal) than the concentration 
coefficient for the specific social insurance transfers.  
                                                 
14  Since results are based on subtraction of transfer income from household survey income aggregates 
rather than from experimental or non-experimental estimates of poverty and inequality impact, we 
refer to reported results as simulated poverty and inequality impacts. However, it is useful to note, that 
at least in the short run, estimates based on the experimental designs of a conditional and an 
unconditional cash transfer programme suggest that transfer programmes have no effect on the labour 
supply of beneficiary households in the rural areas (e.g., Skoufias and di Maro 2008; Skoufias et al. 
2008). 
15  This approach ignores possible behavioural responses (e.g., with households adapting their labour 
market participation in either scenario).  
16  Ferreira et al. (2006).    11
4.2  Public transfers and poverty 
Figure 2 reveals that the poverty impacts of public transfers vary significantly across 
countries in LAC. These impacts depend on a number of factors, including (a) the size 
of unit transfers (which reflects overall spending effort); and (b) targeting and coverage 
of the poor and near poor (which reflect the extent to which transfers actually reach 
lower income households). As such, in some countries and for some transfers, these 
factors converge to make a relatively strong impact. Argentina’s social assistance (Jefes 
programme) is one such example, combining fairly strong targeting, coverage, and high 
unit transfers.17 A contrasting example is Brazil’s social assistance (mainly the pre-
reform CCTs included in the POF 2002–03 survey): despite strong targeting and 
coverage of the poor, their poverty impact is muted by very low unit transfers.  
With social insurance, some countries—such as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, 
Guatemala, and Mexico—record negligible poverty impacts, due to a combination of 
relatively low (net) unit subsidies and very weak targeting and coverage of the poor and 
near poor. In contrast, despite weak targeting and overall regressivity, social insurance 
schemes still do manage to have an important poverty impact due to very high unit 
subsidies (i.e., the small share of social insurance transfers that do reach poorer 
households represents a significant share of their incomes).  
4.3  Impacts of public transfers on social welfare: the distributional characteristic 
The typical measures of redistribution, such as coverage and absolute and relative 
incidence, all emphasize different aspects of transfers, on their own, but they are of 
limited use in simultaneously addressing the issues of magnitude (size) and 
redistribution (targeting). Most social assistance programmes, for example, have 
coverage and absolute incidence that generally favour those at the poorer end of the 
spectrum, but their unit values are typically small, hence dampening their impact on 
poverty and inequality. In contrast, although the (net) unit values of social insurance 
programmes are far more generous, the coverage and distribution of these benefits are 
highly biased in favour of the rich, hence weakening their potential poverty and 
inequality impacts.  
Standardizing budgets and taking into account the full spectrum of households in this 
way, the DCI offers several notable conclusions in terms of the redistributive power and 
social welfare impacts of public transfers in LAC. Countries and programmes are 
ranked by the DCI in summary Tables 3A, 3B, and 3C. Graphs with notable patterns are 
presented in Figures 3, 4, and 5. 
First, social assistance programmes are far more effective than social insurance 
programmes at redistributing income and contributing to social welfare, per unit of 
currency transferred (Figure 3). This is not unexpected, particularly given that the 
primary aim of most social assistance programmes is to reduce poverty and since social 
assistance programmes are not generally linked to formal labour market participation 
(unlike social insurance). Yet the range of this difference is astonishing. For all 
countries in our sample, the per-dollar social welfare contributions of social assistance 
                                                 
17  Admittedly, these simulations do not take into account possible behavioural responses, such as work 
effort, which could be higher with higher unit transfers, as discussed for Argentina below.    12
(DCI) exceed those for social insurance regardless of the degree of ‘concern for 
inequality’ (all values of epsilon; Figure 3).  
Second, the main social welfare gains arise from ‘targeting efficiency’ rather than 
progressively differentiated ‘sizing’ of unit transfers. This result holds across countries 
and types of transfers in our sample. In fact, the ‘sizing’ component is negative 
(regressive) in many instances (Figures 4 and 5). As such, most public transfer 
programmes redistribute income through targeting (i.e., making an effort to channel 
benefits to the poor). Few programmes differentiate the size of benefits (unit values) as 
a way to further redistribute income (e.g., by making larger benefits for poorer or larger 
households). In fact, as discussed above, most programmes have higher unit benefits for 
relatively richer households—which has a regressive ‘sizing’ effect on social welfare 
(Figures 4 and 5). Exceptions to this are Chile’s family allowances and SUF (unified 
family subsidy) benefits, which assign larger unit transfers to poorer and larger families 
(Figure 5).  
Third, within social assistance, conditional cash transfers result in higher social welfare 
(DCIs) than other types of cash or food based transfers (Figure 5). On average, the net 
DCI (combined targeting and sizing components) for CCTs is 2.1, as compared with 1.4 
for school feeding programmes, 0.9 for both other feeding and other cash transfers, and 
0.4 for scholarships. These results hold for various degrees of ‘concern for inequality’ 
(various values of epsilon).  
Fourth, within specific countries, the distributional characteristic varies considerably 
across programmes. Some examples: 
Argentina: The distributional characteristic of net pension subsidies in Argentina is 
about 0.08 as compared with 1.76 for the Household Heads (Jefes de Hogares) 
programme. Thus US$1 distributed through the Jefes programme results in an increase 
social welfare that is 23 times greater than the change in social welfare achieved 
through public spending on pensions (net of contributions). Clearly pensions have 
objectives other than redistribution to the poor (i.e., protecting people in their old age). 
And clearly contribution financed pensions are important instruments for this objective. 
But the use of general tax revenues to plug the large deficits in these pensions—which 
are highly regressive—begs the question of whether or not these public resources could 
be used more effectively elsewhere (e.g., a well-targeted first pillar minimum pension 
for the poor).  
Brazil: A similar comparison could be made for Brazil’s Bolsa Escola (one of the pre-
Bolsa Familia programmes) and publicly financed net pension subsidies in Brazil. The 
DCI for net pension subsidies is 0.2 as compared with 1.5 for Bolsa Escola. Thus US$1 
distributed through Bolsa Escola (now Bolsa Familia) results in an increase in social 
welfare that is over six times greater than the associated change in social welfare 
achieved through tax financed net pension subsidies. Taking a more comparable set of 
programmes, unemployment insurance—though regressive overall—is more effective 
than the FGTS mandatory savings and severance payment scheme. Specifically, US$1 
distributed through unemployment insurance (DCI = 0.35) would deliver an increase in 
social welfare over three times greater than the change in welfare achieved through 
FGTS severance payments (DCI = 0.11).    13
Chile. Like for Brazil and Argentina, Chile could gain in social welfare—or save incur 
fiscal savings—by reallocating tax revenues from social insurance schemes (net 
subsidies) to social assistance programmes (Table 3A). Interestingly, there could also be 
gains from reallocating among social assistance programmes. Specifically, Chile could 
gain in social welfare by reallocating from family allowances to the unified family 
subsidy (SUF). One dollar distributed through SUF (DCI = 2.31) would deliver an 
increase in social welfare that is close to three times greater than the change in social 
welfare associated with family allowances (DCI = 0.79). 
Colombia: As with all other countries, Colombia could gain in social welfare—or incur 
fiscal savings—by reallocating tax revenues towards social assistance programmes 
(Table 3A). Even the targeting of social assistance programmes, however, could be 
improved, particularly for scholarships, which are regressive. (This study does not 
include the conditional cash transfer, Familias en Acción, because it was not included in 
the survey.)  
Dominican Republic: Several social assistance programmes in the survey for the 
Dominican Republic ranked fairly high in terms of their social welfare impact per dollar 
spent (e.g., the school-based transfer, TAE, and school feeding, PAE), as shown in 
Table 3C. These programmes are quite small in terms of budgetary spending and unit 
subsidy values. Others, such as the gas subsidy (DCI = 0.92), did not have such strong 
social welfare impacts. Since the ENCOVI 2004 survey was carried out, the government 
has initiated two conditional cash transfer programmes (Comer es Primero and ILAE) 
to replace the TAE programme, and proposed changes in the gas subsidy. Simulations 
conducted by the IDB suggest that these reforms could result in significantly higher 
social welfare impacts, if properly targeted.  
Guatemala: None of Guatemala’s social insurance or social assistance programmes 
have very strong impacts on social welfare, with the DCI ranging from a low of 0.08 for 
net pension subsidies to 0.64 for the powdered milk/glass of milk programmes 
(Table  3C). Targeting and programme design overall needs to be improved in 
Guatemala, which is also one of the lowest SP spenders in our sample.  
Mexico: Of all of Mexico’s public transfer programmes, only one—the conditional cash 
transfer, Oportunidades—has significant social welfare impacts (DCI column in Tables 
3A–3C). Unsurprisingly, tax funding of net pension subsidies has a fairly small impact 
on social welfare (DCI = 0.15). Yet even many social assistance programmes—most of 
which were regressive—have relatively low social welfare impacts. The social welfare 
contribution of Oportunidades (DCI = 1.67), which includes transfers tied to school 
attendance, is far higher than the social welfare impacts of scholarships (DCI = 0.35). 
Moreover, although the farmer support programme ‘PROCAMPO’ has different 
objectives than Oportunidades, social welfare impacts are over three times greater under 
Oportunidades than under PROCAMPO (DCI = 0.53). 
Peru: As with all other countries in our sample, the tax financing of pension deficits 
(net subsidies) generates relatively low social welfare in Peru, as compared with its 
social assistance programmes. However, even within social assistance, welfare gains 
could be incurred by reallocating public expenditures or strengthening targeting. For 
example, Peru could gain in social welfare by reallocating resources from the Glass of 
Milk programme (DCI = 0.93) to the school feeding programmes, such as school 
breakfasts (DCI = 1.32), or by improving the targeting of the Glass of Milk programme.   14
Yet none of these food based programmes generates the high social welfare gains 
observed for the conditional cash transfer programmes (such as SUF/Solidario, Bolsa 
Escola, Oportunidades) in other countries.  
5  Concluding remarks and policy implications 
This study informs a broader debate about the consequences of globalization for income 
inequality. While consensus is elusive on the redistributive effects of globalization, 
some consensus exists that the effect is non-zero: globalization redistributes income. 
Understanding the potential of social assistance and insurance to magnify or 
compensate for the redistributive effects of globalization lends insight as to reasonable 
social safety nets to implement when countries decrease tariffs and trade barriers and in 
other ways embrace globalization. 
This paper is specifically concerned with the redistributive impacts of social policy, 
focusing only on a subset of social policy instruments: public transfers (and, 
specifically, those that were included in household surveys). It is essential, however, to 
keep in mind that social policy has other important objectives besides redistribution, 
including (a) smoothing of income over the life cycle in relation to people’s needs; 
(b) promoting the accumulation of human capital; and (c) ensuring adequate protection 
against events such as sickness, disability, unemployment, or loss of income. Although 
these additional objectives are not considered in detail here, they must be taken into 
consideration when assessing the overall efficiency of public transfers.18 
With these caveats in mind, our findings suggest that public transfers can be effective 
instruments to redistribute income to the poor. But they have not often done so. 
Specifically, the redistributive performance of social insurance and social assistance 
transfers can be summarized as follows: Social assistance has a stronger impact in 
reducing inequality than social insurance.  
The impacts of social insurance on inequality are fairly small—and in some cases these 
schemes actually increase inequality (Guatemala, Peru). In contrast, social insurance 
schemes in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile tend to decrease inequality. 
The poverty impacts of public transfers vary significantly across countries in LAC. 
Social assistance programmes are far more effective than social insurance programmes 
at redistributing income and contributing to social welfare, per unit of currency 
transferred. 
The main social welfare gains arise from ‘targeting efficiency’ rather than progressively 
differentiated ‘sizing’ of unit transfers. This result holds across countries and types of 
transfers in our sample. In fact, the ‘sizing’ component is negative (regressive) in many 
instances (Figures 4 and 5). As such, most public transfer programmes redistribute 
income through targeting (i.e., making an effort to channel benefits to the poor). Few 
programmes differentiate the size of benefits (unit values) as a way to further 
                                                 
18  Transfers that are not reaching the poor segments of the population and thus appear to perform poorly 
from a redistributive perspective, may perform well when examined in terms of the other objectives of 
social policy.   15
redistribute income (e.g., by making larger benefits for poorer or larger households). In 
fact, as discussed above, most programmes have higher unit benefits for relatively richer 
households—which has a regressive ‘sizing’ effect on social welfare. 
There is considerable variation in redistributive impacts within the class of social 
assistance transfers. Too many are regressive. These include scholarships and many 
food based programmes. Governments should reconsider these programmes—or at least 
strengthen their design. The relatively high progressivity of CCTs is likely driven by a 
clear definition of the poor as the target group and the explicit use of targeting 
mechanisms to determine eligibility, and not on their conditionalities per se. Such 
design mechanisms could be built into other social assistance programmes, for example 
using a combination of geographic targeting and individual assessment mechanisms to 
target needs based scholarships.  
The duality of these social insurance and social assistance systems suggests that there is 
ample room for improvements in the consistency and coordination of social polices. 
Many countries have undertaken reforms to improve these systems, but such reforms 
generally follow parallel tracks. A more integrated approach based on a better 
understanding of the trade-offs in social policies could bring about redistributive and 
efficiency gains that can allow LAC countries to reap more benefits from globalization 
(e.g. Grosh et al. 2008). 
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Table 1 Classification of public transfers from household surveys: eight country case studies in 
LAC 
With per cent of social assistance and gross social insurance spending that is covered by the 
programmes listed in household survey questionnaires 
Country/survey  Public social assistance  
(SA) 






66% of SA Spending* 
Heads of household programme 
(Jefes) 
89% of gross SI 
spending* 
a 





23% of SA spending*
 b 
Auxilio Gas (AG) 
Bolsa Escola (BE) 
Minimum income (Renda minima) 
Chile labour eradication (PETI) 

















85% of SA spending* 
Chile solidarity 
Unified family subsidies (SUF) 
Family allowance, scholarships 
Potable water subsidy 

















79% of SA spending* 
Preschool lunch and pre-school 
snack 
School snack or lunch, school 
restaurants 
School scholarships 
Hogar comunitario, guarderia o 
jardin 
Family, women, and infants 
(FAMI) 









68% of SA spending* 
School assistance card (TAE) 
School feeding programme (PAE) 
Essential drugs programme 
(PROMESE) 
National price stabilization 
(INESPRE) 
Gas subsidy 
100% of gross SI 
spending* 








92% of SA spending* 
School snack, school breakfast 
Milk: powdered, glass; glass of 
corn mush (atoll) 
School transport subsidy and 
scholarships; school materials 
packet; nutrition pension 



























77% of SA spending* 
Glass of milk, Comedor popular, 
infantil 
School breakfast, school lunch 
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Notes:  
a Unemployment insurance was included in the survey, but was excluded from our 
analysis due to insufficient numbers of observations. 
 
b Several important social assistance programmes were not included in the POF 
survey, including the Bolsa Familia Programme, the BPC-LOAS cash transfers for the 
poor, elderly, and disabled, and school feeding. The Bolsa Familia Programme was 
launched after the POF 2002-03 survey was conducted. The POF 2002-03 did include 
questions on receipt of Bolsa Escola (BE) and Auxilio Gas (AG), which are two of the 
four pre-reform programmes that were merged to create Bolsa Familia. 
 
c Public pensions in the POF questionnaire refer to pensions paid by the public 
‘previdencia’ agency. These could include pensions to civil servants (RJU) or to private 
sector workers (RGPS). 
 
d For Mexico, we used the ENNVIH 2002 survey, which yields significantly different 
results for redistributive outcomes than other surveys, such as the ENIGH surveys. 
Should the data from the ENIGH 2004 become available soon, we intend to redo the 
analysis using this new survey. 
 
e Includes the programmes VIVAH, Credito a Palabra, PET, Alianza para el Campo, Fund 
for micro, small, and medium enterprises, and ‘All other transfers’. 
  * Per cent of total public spending in each category (SA and SI) that was captured by 
the programmes included in the household survey (see Annex 2). For SI, percentages 
indicated here refer to gross pension benefits. As discussed in Annex 3, we make a 
further adjustment to net out contributions (net pension subsidies).  
  ** Household survey does not distinguish between private and public pensions (social 
security).  
  *** Pension information is available for the Dominican Republic but we assume a net 
subsidy of zero since it is apparently fully funded by contributions (see Annex 3). 
Analysis uses net subsidies for pensions for all other countries.  
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Table 2 Overview of eight household surveys used in this report 










National Institute of 
Censuses and 
Statistics (INDEC) 
4/03 16,924  Income 
from INDEC 
Brazil Family  Budget 
Survey (POF) 







Chile National  Socio- 
Econ. Survey 
(CASEN) 





68,146 Income  from 
MIDEPLAN 






















































Peru National  Survey 
of households 
(ENAHO) 
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Table 3A Summary indicators by class of public transfers: social protection, social assistance, and social insurance  
CGH CGH DCI
A l l  B e n e f . B e n e f .  Q 5 / Q 1 Q 1Q 5Q 1Q 5Q 1Q 5 F o r  Q 1 F o r  Q 1 + Q 2 E p s i l o n = 2
TOTAL SOCIAL PROTECTION
COL SPT All social protection 19.3                    1.9                  45% 26% 24% 25% 8.0% 0.8% 1.18              1.02              0.79             
MEX SPT All social protection 21.1                    9.6                  40% 22% 10% 51% 4.1% 0.6% 0.48              0.58              0.47             
GUA SPT All social protection 10.1                    4.1                  64% 39% 12% 29% 8.0% 2.2% 0.59              0.75              0.43             
ARG SPT All social protection 79.6                    6.9                  34% 30% 7% 44% 39.3% 9.1% 0.36              0.49              0.43             
CHL SPT All social protection 41.0                    7.1                  74% 41% 10% 38% 13.0% 4.3% 0.48              0.57              0.41             
BRA SPT All social protection 43.3                    9.3                  54% 43% 7% 52% 9.4% 4.4% 0.34              0.42              0.29             
PER SPT All social protection 17.6                    46.2                72% 31% 3% 63% 2.6% 6.7% 0.16              0.20              0.17             
TOTAL SOCIAL INSURANCE (NET BENEFITS)
BRA SIT All social insurance 52.9                    6.9                  28% 42% 5% 54% 6.9% 4.3% 0.27              0.35              0.23             
CHL SIT All social insurance 80.9                    6.0                  14% 27% 4% 46% 4.2% 4.0% 0.20              0.32              0.22             
MEX SIT All social insurance 65.6                    4.2                  2% 10% 3% 63% 0.8% 0.4% 0.15              0.36              0.16             
PER SIT All social insurance 100.1                  3.6                  1% 20% 1% 68% 0.7% 6.6% 0.05              0.10              0.11             
COL SIT All social insurance 23.7                    5.6                  1% 17% 1% 66% 0.1% 0.6% 0.05              0.12              0.09             
GUA SIT All social insurance 20.7                    10.1                1% 9% 1% 81% 0.1% 0.7% 0.06              0.09              0.08             
ARG SIT All social insurance 106.1                  12.0                5% 29% 1% 56% 3.4% 9.0% 0.04              0.14              0.08             
DOM SIT All Social Insurance (SS health) 46.1                    N.A. 2% 3% 7% 30% 0.3% 0.1% 0.37              0.55              N.A.
TOTAL SOCIAL ASSISTANCE
ARG SAT All social assistance 35.9                    1.7                  30% 1% 32% 1% 35.9% 0.1% 1.60              1.80              1.76             
BRA SAT All social assistance 6.7                      4.1                  34% 3% 38% 12% 2.4% 0.0% 1.89              1.65              1.40             
DOM SAT All Social Assistance N.A. N.A. 94% 96% 14% 28% 7.1% 0.9% 0.70              0.77              1.3               
COL SAT All social assistance 17.0                    1.0                  45% 9% 33% 6% 7.9% 0.1% 1.67              1.42              1.09             
CHL SAT All social assistance 11.9                    1.2                  69% 19% 28% 10% 8.8% 0.3% 1.40              1.37              1.03             
MEX SAT All social assistance 9.6                      4.0                  38% 15% 20% 31% 3.3% 0.1% 0.99              0.94              0.97             
PER SAT All social assistance 1.6                      1.2                  72% 12% 30% 6% 1.9% 0.1% 1.51              1.36              0.94             
GUA SAT All social assistance 9.3                      3.4                  64% 32% 13% 22% 7.9% 1.5% 0.66              0.83              0.48             
Average Unit Value, US$PPP Coverage Abs. Inc Rel. Inc
 
Note: Authors’ estimations using household surveys. Dominican Republic: IDB estimates from ENCOVI (2004). Using the same general notation as in the text, coverage is 
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Table 3B Summary indicators by class of public transfers: social insurance transfers 
 







All Benef. Benef. Q5/Q1 Q1 Q5 Q1  Q5 Q1 Q5 For Q1 For Q1+Q2 Epsilon=2 
CHL  SIP Unemployment 21.6    5.8    1% 0% 18%  35% 0.1% 0.0% 0.92    0.90    0.83      
CHL  SIP Disability pension 50.0    2.9    2% 1% 9%  23% 0.5% 0.1% 0.45    0.67    0.41      
BRA  SIP Seguro desemprego 18.6    2.6    2% 2% 8%  26% 0.2% 0.0% 0.39    0.65    0.35      
DOM  SIP SS-Health 46.1    N.A. 2% 3% 7%  30% 0.3% 0.1% 0.37    0.55    N.A. 
CHL  SIP Orphan pension 29.4    3.9    0% 1% 5%  39% 0.0% 0.0% 0.25    0.48    0.35      
CHL  SIP Widow pension 59.3    4.7    4% 6% 6%  43% 1.1% 0.6% 0.30    0.42    0.28      
BRA  SIP Abono salarial PIS/PASEP  2.0    1.6    3% 11% 6%  31% 0.1% 0.0% 0.29    0.46    0.28      
BRA  SIP Public Leave Benefits 32.8    3.9    1% 1% 5%  28% 0.1% 0.1% 0.24    0.48    0.24      
BRA  SIP Public Pension receipts  66.3    8.1    24% 31% 5%  55% 6.5% 4.2% 0.26    0.34    0.23      
MEX  SIP Indemnizations 24.5    11.6    1% 1% 3%  32% 0.1% 0.0% 0.14    0.35    0.22      
CHL  SIP Old-age pension 88.3    6.0    8% 21% 3%  49% 2.5% 3.2% 0.16    0.27    0.19      
MEX  SIP Retirement Pensions 75.7    3.3    1% 9% 3%  66% 0.8% 0.4% 0.16    0.36    0.15      
PER SIP Pensions 100.1    3.6    1% 20% 1%  68% 0.7% 6.6% 0.05    0.10    0.11      
COL  SIP Retirement pension 23.7    5.6    1% 17% 1%  66% 0.1% 0.6% 0.05    0.12    0.09      
GUA  SIP Retirement pension and survivorship pension 20.7    10.1    1% 9% 1%  81% 0.1% 0.7% 0.06    0.09    0.08      
ARG  SIP Pensions 106.1    12.0    5% 29% 1%  56% 3.4% 9.0% 0.04    0.14    0.08      
Average Unit Value, US$PPP Coverage Abs. Inc Rel. Inc  22
Table 3C Summary indicators by class of public transfers: social assistance transfers 
CGH CGH DCI
A l l  B e n e f . B e n e f .  Q 5 / Q 1 Q 1Q 5Q 1Q 5Q 1Q 5 F o r  Q 1 F o r  Q 1 + Q 2 E p s i l o n = 2
TAE-School Assist. Card 10.8                    N.A. 8% 1% 35% 7% 0.4% 0.0% 1.75              1.48              3.3               
PAE-School Feeding 9.1                      N.A. 50% 11% 32% 7% 2.6% 0.0% 1.60              1.46              2.9               
SUF 5.5                      0.8                  31% 1% 60% 1% 1.9% 0.0% 2.98              2.10              2.31             
PETI 5.5                      0.7                  2% 0% 66% 0% 0.1% 0.0% 3.30              2.24              2.26             
Solidario 6.2                      1.2                  3% 0% 56% 2% 0.2% 0.0% 2.81              2.02              2.10             
Auxilio Gas 1.5                      3.7                  16% 0% 48% 2% 0.3% 0.0% 2.39              2.01              1.87             
Head of household program 35.9                    1.7                  30% 1% 32% 1% 35.9% 0.1% 1.60              1.80              1.76             
Oportunidades (PROGRESA) 6.8                      1.7                  32% 2% 35% 4% 2.5% 0.0% 1.73              1.58              1.67             
PROMESE-medicines 0.5                      N.A. 54% 39% 17% 20% 0.1% 0.0% 0.85              0.90              1.6               
INESPRE/ Popular markets 2.1                      N.A. 39% 31% 17% 21% 0.4% 0.0% 0.83              0.89              1.5               
Bolsa Escola 5.5                      5.7                  27% 2% 40% 15% 1.6% 0.0% 1.98              1.63              1.47             
Desayuno escolar 1.5                      1.0                  30% 2% 44% 3% 0.8% 0.0% 2.22              1.79              1.32             
Comedor infantil 2.3                      1.0                  2% 0% 43% 3% 0.1% 0.0% 2.13              1.87              1.32             
Almuerzo escolar 0.8                      0.9                  8% 0% 45% 1% 0.1% 0.0% 2.25              1.94              1.28             
Disability PASIS 31.3                    1.3                  7% 0% 35% 2% 2.1% 0.0% 1.74              1.66              1.28             
Community child care or kindergarten 26.0                    1.0                  16% 2% 37% 5% 4.3% 0.1% 1.85              1.49              1.20             
FAMI 8.9                      1.2                  3% 0% 38% 7% 0.3% 0.0% 1.91              1.53              1.14             
Restaurante escolar 4.5                      1.1                  7% 2% 29% 8% 0.3% 0.0% 1.47              1.47              1.08             
Preschoool lunch 12.5                    1.3                  15% 2% 33% 5% 1.7% 0.0% 1.65              1.46              1.05             
School snack or lunch 0.8                      1.1                  22% 4% 30% 6% 0.2% 0.0% 1.48              1.42              1.03             
Preschool snack 7.1                      1.5                  15% 2% 30% 7% 0.9% 0.0% 1.52              1.35              1.02             
Renda minima 8.1                      3.1                  6% 1% 26% 10% 0.4% 0.0% 1.30              1.49              0.95             
Old age PASIS  38.6                    1.5                  6% 1% 26% 5% 1.8% 0.0% 1.32              1.47              0.94             
Vaso de leche 0.2                      1.4                  57% 10% 29% 7% 0.2% 0.0% 1.44              1.36              0.93             
Gas Subsidy 15.7                    N.A. 74% 93% 9% 34% 3.5% 0.0% 0.46              0.59              0.9               
Potable water subsidy 2.9                      2.2                  14% 2% 24% 7% 0.3% 0.0% 1.18              1.27              0.89             
Family allowance 4.6                      0.6                  28% 15% 24% 7% 1.8% 0.0% 1.19              1.30              0.79             
Comedor popular 7.6                      1.8                  6% 1% 20% 9% 0.6% 0.0% 1.01              1.03              0.67             
Powdered milk or glass of milk 2.0                      1.3                  7% 3% 21% 12% 0.3% 0.0% 1.03              1.21              0.64             
School breakfast 6.5                      2.5                  36% 8% 18% 9% 3.7% 0.2% 0.89              1.14              0.62             
School materials packet 2.7                      2.3                  32% 11% 18% 14% 1.3% 0.1% 0.89              1.06              0.61             
Glass of corn mush (atol) 1.9                      1.7                  41% 19% 17% 14% 1.4% 0.1% 0.86              0.97              0.58             
PROCAMPO 6.7                      5.8                  11% 6% 12% 43% 0.4% 0.0% 0.60              0.60              0.53             
School snack 1.7                      2.0                  38% 22% 13% 15% 1.0% 0.1% 0.66              0.85              0.50             
Scholarships* 33.9                    5.8                  4% 2% 11% 31% 0.7% 0.2% 0.56              0.63              0.46             
School scholarship 5.5                      7.0                  9% 2% 14% 19% 0.2% 0.0% 0.69              0.72              0.45             
Scholarships 13.4                    10.6                5% 5% 5% 61% 0.2% 0.1% 0.26              0.25              0.35             
Other Gov transfers* 8.9                      7.4                  3% 2% 7% 50% 0.1% 0.0% 0.37              0.54              0.33             
School transport subsidy or school scho 6.8                      4.3                  2% 5% 3% 38% 0.1% 0.1% 0.13              0.17              0.18             
Nutrition pension (alimenticia) 36.7                    6.6                  1% 5% 1% 59% 0.1% 0.8% 0.06              0.17              0.12             
Average Unit Value, US$PPP Coverage Abs. Inc Rel. Inc
 
Note:   see Table 3A   23
































































































































































Source: Authors’ estimates from household surveys; Dominican Republic: IDB estimates from ENCOVI (2004). 
Note:   Under social insurance, we use the average adjusted net pension subsidies (net of average contributions). 
For the Dominican Republic, social insurance only includes SS Health and not pensions since available 
evidence suggests full contributions for that scheme, and hence a zero net subsidy. 
Figure 2 Simulated impacts of public transfers on poverty 













































































Source: Authors’ estimates from household surveys; Dominican Republic: IDB estimates from ENCOVI (2004).  
Note:   Under social insurance, we use the average adjusted net pension subsidies (net of average contributions). 
For the Dominican Republic, social insurance only includes SS Health and not pensions since available 
evidence suggests full contributions for that scheme, and hence a zero net subsidy.   24
Figure 3 The welfare impact of public transfers depending on society’s ‘concern about inequality’ 
 
Distributional Characteristic 
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Figure 4 Decomposing the welfare impact of public transfers: targeting and sizing components  
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Figure 5 Decomposing the welfare impact of specific types of transfer programmes 
Contribution to Social Welfare: 
































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Authors’ estimates from household surveys; Dominican Republic: IDB estimates from ENCOVI (2004). 
 